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Preface 
This paper is part of the research project «Regulation, Control and Auditing, funded by 
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Sector Agencies – The Problem of Coping with Autonomy, Steering and Regulation», 
July 6–8, 2006. We would like to thank the participants in this workshop for valuable 
comments. We will also thank Beate Erikstad, Jonas Folmo and Synnøve Serigstad who 
have conduced the cases on the Competition Authority, the Post- and Telecommuni-
cation Authority and the homeland security.  
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Sammendrag 
I dette notatet undersøker vi vilkårene for å gjennomføre den nye regulerings- og 
tilsynspolitikken i Norge. Vi undersøker både prosessen i forbindelse med regjeringens 
tilsynsmelding og beslutningsprosser i forbindelse med utvalgte tilsyn. Vi argumenterer 
for at reguleringsorganene opererer i en kompleks politisk-administrativ kontekst, og at 
vi må kombinere instrumentelle og institusjonelle perspektiver for å forstå hvordan de 
fungerer i praksis. En rasjonell-økonomisk tilnærming holdes opp mot en transformativ 
tilnærming som omfatter organisasjonsstrukturelle elementer, kulturelle komponenter og 
trekk ved institusjonaliserte omgivelser. Vi beskriver hvordan den nye regulerings-
politikken ble introdusert i Norge og fokuserer på reformer av tilsynsorgan i to sektorer 
så vel som reguleringspraksis i to tilsynsorgan. Hovedbildet er at det er en løs kopling 
mellom det idealet som OECD reguleringsreformer forutsetter og a) den generelle 
tilsynspolitikk i Norge, b) reorganisering av tilsynsorgan i utvalgte sektorer og c) 
hvordan reguleringspraksisen utøves i utvalgte tilsyn i konkrete saker.  
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Summary 
In this paper we examine the preconditions for fulfilling the aims of the regulatory 
reform in the case of Norway by comparing different decision-making processes in 
regulatory agencies. We cover both the process of regulatory reorganization and 
decision-making within established regulatory structures. Our theoretical point of 
departure is that regulatory agencies operate in a complex political-administrative 
context and that we must combine instrumental and institutional perspectives to 
understand how they work in practice. We start by contrasting the rational-economic 
approach with a broad transformative perspective that embraces organizational-
structural elements, cultural components and features from the institutional 
environment Second, we give a brief outline of the context in which agencies operate 
and administrative reforms have been implemented in Norway. Third, we describe how 
a new regulatory reform policy has been introduced in Norway over the last three years. 
Fourth, we focus on agency reform processes in two policy areas and on regulatory 
practice in two regulatory agencies as case studies. Fifth, we discuss regulatory reform 
processes and practice from different theoretical perspectives. Finally, we draw some 
conclusions and address their implications. The main picture is that there is a loose 
coupling between the OECD regulatory policy ideal and a) general Norwegian 
regulatory policy; b) the reorganization of regulatory agencies in specific policy areas; 
and c) regulatory practice in individual cases. 
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Introduction 
Many countries have followed the lead of the OECD and implemented regulatory 
reforms that give agencies much more autonomy and formally make the role of 
regulatory agencies less ambiguous both internally and in relation to other regulatory 
agencies, public authorities, and the subjects of regulation (OECD 2002a). The 
justification for such reforms is that the effectiveness and efficiency of regulatory 
agencies will increase if they operate at arms-length from the political executive and that 
they will attend more closely to professional norms and values and use unambiguous 
rules to regulate activities in the public or private sector (OECD 2002b). It is also 
claimed that the more autonomous model will increase transparency and thus enhance 
credibility and impartiality and reduce political opportunism. This way of organizing 
regulatory activities – whereby authority is delegated and professional actors removed 
from political control so that they implement public goals on behalf of executive leaders 
in close collaboration with the subjects of regulation – would also seem to have wider 
political-democratic implications. It is held by some to be a more direct and better 
regulatory model. 
An alternative interpretation of this development, based on a broad transformative 
approach (Christensen and Lægreid 2001), is that this model, often initiated by political 
leaders, has weakened the potential for political control and created more complex and 
conflict-ridden decision-making processes involving a more complex set of actors, 
problems, and solutions. A more traditional model of central steering assigns primary 
importance to maintaining a close connection between citizens in their role as voters, 
elected politicians, and the political executive and places political control above 
professional autonomy. Advocates of this model believe the political executive should 
be able both to control the laws/rules and policy framework according to which the 
regulatory agencies work and to interfere in individual cases where necessary. It should 
also be in a position to obtain information about regulatory practice and to fulfill the 
popular mandate assigned to it. By contrast, autonomous models of the OECD type 
allow regulatory agencies to ignore political signals and to «go native,» developing an 
excessively close relationship with the subjects of regulation. This potentially leads to 
inconsistency  in regulatory practice. In addition, despite allegedly unambiguous rules 
and professional values, the large degree of discretion that the new model allows 
professionals in enacting regulations, suggests that the impartiality held to be the main 
advantage of this model is not guaranteed. As a result, the new regulatory model may 
actually produce more conflicts and negotiations than the old one. 
We contrast and discuss these different views using as an example the new general 
regulatory policy in Norway. By comparing different decision-making processes in 
regulatory agencies, we examine the preconditions for fulfilling the aims of the 
regulatory reform. We cover both the process of regulatory reorganization and decision-
making within established regulatory structures. Our theoretical point of departure is 
that regulatory agencies operate in a complex political-administrative context and that 
we must combine instrumental and institutional perspectives to understand how they 
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work in practice. This will yield a more complex, but probably a more realistic picture 
than the rational-economic scenario that forms the basis for the official OECD 
regulatory model. 
We start by contrasting the rational-economic approach with a broad transformative 
perspective that embraces organizational-structural elements, cultural components and 
features from the institutional environment (Christensen and Lægreid 2001). Second, we 
give a brief outline of the context in which agencies operate and administrative reforms 
have been implemented in Norway. Third, we describe how a new regulatory reform 
policy has been introduced in Norway over the last three years. Fourth, we focus on 
agency reform processes in two policy areas (internal security and immigration policy) 
and on regulatory practice in two regulatory agencies (the Competition Authority and 
the Post and Telecommunications Authority) as case studies. Fifth, we discuss 
regulatory reform processes and practice from different theoretical perspectives. Finally, 
we draw some conclusions and address their implications. 
Contrasting models of regulatory activities 
A point of departure for understanding the new wave of establishing regulatory agencies 
and giving them more autonomy from the political executive is to focus on the OECD 
as a producer, certifier, and carrier of new reform ideas, prescriptions, and doctrines 
(Marcussen 2004, Sahlin-Andersson and Lerdell 1997). In 1995, the OECD launched a 
regulatory reform program whose main components were the regulation of the market, 
competition policy, and the establishment of independent regulatory agencies. It 
assessed regulatory policy in all member countries with the aim of improving the quality 
of regulation by fostering competition, efficiency and performance. The concept of 
distributed public governance, produced by the OECD and used by the EU, refers to 
the emergence of quasi-independent non-majoritarian and non-governmental 
organizations (Flinders 2004, OECD 2002a). The doctrine is that regulatory agencies are 
most effective if they are independent from the ministry, operate according to a clear 
regulatory policy, and are staffed by experts (OECD 1995, 1997, 2002a). In line with 
this, evidence-based decision-making is to replace the informal, consensus-based 
approach to regulatory processes that was previously the normal policy style in countries 
like Norway (OECD 2003).  
The basis for this official regulatory model seems primarily to be a version of new 
institutional economic theories. What we may label a rational-economic approach will tend to 
see external pressure for regulatory reform as functional, arising from a need to increase 
credibility and reduce political insecurity (Knott and Hammond 2003). In rational-
economic terms the development of modern regulatory agencies is seen as an apolitical 
and pragmatic solution to problems such as lack of capacity and attention, time 
constraints, and lack of professional knowledge and expertise on the part of the political 
executive. The increased complexity of public policy is said to have reduced the 
effectiveness of traditional command-and-control techniques. The argument is that 
delegating regulatory authority from politicians to experts will reduce decision-making 
costs and enhance efficiency and quality without having negative effects on other goals 
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and values (Majone 2001). The delegation argument is an old one in the history of 
regulatory reforms (Bernstein 1955) and it has a strong apolitical and technocratic 
flavor. One example is the de-politicization of key regulatory activities such as central 
banking (Marcussen 2006). 
Majone (1999), a leading theorist of this school of thought, sees regulatory activities 
as a question of political credibility. Based on the idea of the primacy of business and 
markets over politics, the government delegates regulatory authority to experts and 
independent agencies at arm’s length from the political executive in order to avoid 
short-term and arbitrary political interference and enhance the fairness and legitimacy of 
regulatory activities. The argument is that the body to which this authority is delegated 
should be independent in order to enhance the credibility of policy commitments 
(Majone 2001). The creation of autonomous agencies is justified by the perceived need 
to insulate certain activities from political influence. The prescription is that 
autonomous regulatory agencies can provide greater policy continuity, impartiality, 
predictability, and consistency than cabinets and ministries because they are not 
dependent on electoral returns. The delegation of power to an independent agency is 
seen as a way to restrain central government and to restrict its future freedom of action 
and also to reduce political uncertainty and opportunism.  
The rational-economic approach, with its focus on formal institutional design, has 
generally become more popular over the past decade (Coen and Thatcher 2005). 
Politicians seem to have both credibility and political uncertainty in mind when they 
create regulatory agencies (Giraldi 2004). The official raison d’être for autonomous 
agencies is that structural separation, more managerial autonomy, and managerial 
accountability for results will improve performance and efficiency. In practice, however, 
this has not been a general finding. It would be fair to say that the official model is a 
special case that seems to work pretty well under specific conditions—namely, in 
situations with low political salience, where results and activities are easy to observe, 
where the tasks do not involve complex technology, where professionals and experts 
agree, where the risk is relatively low, where the financial resources involved are fairly 
modest, and where the policy does not involve redistribution issues (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2006). When these preconditions are not fulfilled, however (which may be quite 
often), it tends to run into trouble (Pollitt et al. 2004).  
Our alternative transformative approach to regulatory activities combines 
instrumental and institutional perspectives from organization theories (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2001). From an instrumental or organizational-structural perspective control via 
regulation may be seen as compensation for loss of traditional control by central 
government, owing to privatization, managerial autonomy, and delegation. It may also 
be seen as a strategy for politicians to avoid blame by shifting responsibility for policy 
failure to bureaucrats and experts (Majone 1999, Hood 2002) and attributing it to an 
instrumental conflict among actors with different interests. Autonomous agencies create 
a buffer zone that political executives can use to shift blame, whereby politicians tend to 
delegate responsibility for failures but not for successes, and agencies tend to accept 
responsibility for successes but not for failures.  
According to this perspective, political and administrative leaders are often central 
actors in the establishment of regulatory agencies, and they give various instrumental 
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reasons for moving away from an integrated model. As shown, while some of the 
problems and solutions seem to be defined in real terms, others are more symbolic in 
character. This perspective also offers potential insights into why the increased 
horizontal and particularly vertical inter-organizational specialization brought about by 
the establishment of regulatory agencies often leads to an undermining of political 
control (Christensen and Lægreid 2004). The instrumental effects of having a 
disintegrated model instead of an integrated one seem obvious − i.e., there is a 
considerable difference between having regulatory tasks integrated in a ministry or 
organized in regulatory agencies, with agencies in general having a lot of autonomy 
(Egeberg 2003). Both the levers of control and political signals are weakened by 
establishing regulatory agencies.  
As the cultural aspect of institutionalized organizations would suggest, what happens in 
one country is not a blueprint for developments in other countries (Gains 2004). 
Specific national policies and regulations for managing health, safety and environmental 
risk continue to diverge (Vogel 2003). Regulatory reforms reinforce distinctive 
underlying national trajectories and historical legacies, and the functional pressure 
highlighted by rational theory is mediated and constrained by cultural-contextual factors 
(Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002). The rise of regulation and the use of independent 
agencies is not only a product of neo-liberalism but is also connected to a decline in 
trust in political institutions (Hood et al. 1999, Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004). The 
increasing number of autonomous regulatory agencies can be seen as a response to this 
development.  
In line with an institutional environment perspective, the spread of the regulatory agency 
form might be seen as a diffusion process (Giraldi 2003, Jordana and Levi-Faur 2005). 
The diffusion of the regulatory agency form takes place within sectors, across country 
borders, and within countries across sectors, whereby the first process seems to be 
faster than the last. There are endogenous sources of change, group processes, and 
diffusion of best practices through policy networks, which create «world societies» of 
common understanding of what are appropriate problems and good solutions (Meier et 
al. 1997). Thus, the great increase in regulatory agencies may be better explained by a 
constructivist approach than by a rational one. There seems to be a strong element of 
symbolic diffusion of autonomous regulatory agencies, accompanied by imitation, 
preconceived notions, and a search for legitimacy (Giraldi 2003). Generally, there is a 
growing empirical literature, focusing on diffusion, borrowing, and translation of 
organizational forms like the regulatory agency, but also on the importance of historical 
institutionalism, path dependency, and historical inefficiency as well as contextual 
factors related to tasks and contingencies (Lodge 2001, Jordana and Sancho 2004, Busch 
2002).  
Summing up, according to the transformative approach, which combines 
organizational theories, the complexity of the organizational context matters, task-
specific factors are important, and much of what happens is the result of a blend of 
external pressure, path dependency, and choice (Olsen 1992). The diffusion of 
independent regulatory agencies in Europe seems to be a mixture of top-down factors 
conditioned by domestic responses to national pressure from international sources such 
as EU bodies, bottom-up factors linked to credibility and political uncertainty, and 
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horizontal factors that promote diffusion between countries through mechanisms such 
as «taken-for-grantedness» and symbolic imitation (Giraldi 2005). Thus, the formal 
structure should not be viewed in isolation: it is important to look at how tasks are 
structured and also at the historical-institutional context, and at external networks and 
influences. There are variations in how the rules for control, instructions, and appeals 
are formulated for different agencies and in how they are executed (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2004). Instead of deriving explanations based on one dominant logic, the 
challenge is to develop more complex propositions about how regulatory agencies are 
organized and how they work. It is possible to do this using a transformative approach. 
The context of agencies and administrative 
reforms in Norway 
The organizational affiliation of Norwegian agencies and their status and role vis-à-vis 
the ministries have been important issues for nearly 180 years (Christensen 2003). A 
major cleavage in Norwegian administrative history has been that between political and 
administrative leaders (often jurists), who believe in an integrated model furthering 
political control, and professional groups, who demand professional autonomy through 
the creation of new agencies. Norway’s constitution of 1814 introduced hierarchically 
organized ministries. By the 1830s, professional groups, such as engineers, doctors, and 
military leaders, were mounting their first attacks on the dominance of the jurists in the 
integrated and hierarchical state (Christensen and Roness 1999). Around 1850 they 
succeeded in pushing through their demands for independent professional bodies 
outside the ministries and the first agencies were established, primarily in the 
communications sector. This first wave of agencies was followed by a second one in the 
1870s. This established the independent agency type, imitated from Sweden, which has 
been the dominant one in Norway ever since.  
In the mid-1950s the government adopted a new principle for agency structure and 
increased the number of independent agencies. The background to this was that the 
ministers needed to delegate some of their functions and tasks in order to gain more 
capacity for strategic thinking (Grønlie and Nagel 1998), an argument similar to the one 
used to justify NPM-related reforms 40 years later. The doctrine recommended the 
same organizational solution that the professional groups had supported since the 
1830s. The idea was that more technical issues and routine functions should be moved 
to the agencies, while policy and planning tasks should stay with the ministries. The new 
doctrine resulted in the establishment of several new agencies over the next 15 years, 
but this development slowed down in the 1970s, partly for political reasons (Grønlie 
1999).  
The dominant agency model in Norway has historically been rather unified, with little 
horizontal specialization. In most agencies administrative functions, regulatory and 
control functions, and service-providing functions have been combined and integrated. 
Traditionally Norway has not had any type of administrative court. Appeals have been 
directed to the ministry, which can also instruct the agencies. It is a rather new idea that 
there ought to be different types of agencies, even if some of the agencies have had 
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extended autonomy for some time, mainly in budgetary and personnel matters but also 
in some more substantive areas (Lægreid et al. 2003). 
Over the past 15 years, partly inspired by NPM, but also as part of Norway’s 
adaptation to the EU and the internal market, a process of structural devolution has 
been going on in the Norwegian central public administration, and the agency model 
has become more differentiated (Christensen and Lægreid 2003). Up until the mid-
1990s major public sectors like railways, telecommunications, power, postal services, 
forestry, grain sales, airport administration, road construction, and public broadcasting, 
were organized as integrated government services, whereby the state simultaneously 
held the roles of owner, provider, purchaser, regulator, and controller. Since then, the 
commercial parts of these enterprises have become corporate, while the regulatory parts 
have been streamlined into separate agencies, creating a much more fragmented and 
disintegrated model.  
In 2001 there were 169 central administrative bodies in Norway. Sixty of these 
bodies are now typical agencies: 25 are mainly regulatory agencies, while 11 have 
regulatory functions together with other tasks. Over time an increasing proportion of 
agencies have been allocated regulation and scrutiny as their primary task in addition to 
other, secondary tasks (Rubecksen 2004). 
Summing up, agencies have been a major organizational form in the Norwegian 
central government for a long time and have displayed a lot of path-dependency. This 
situation was the result of a long historical conflict between the political executive and 
professional groups. Since the mid-1990s NPM has gained a stronger footing in 
Norway, and reforms have become increasingly comprehensive and radical in recent 
years (Christensen and Lægreid 2002). Changes in forms of affiliation from integrated 
ministerial models to single-purpose models, increased agencification, and the establish-
ment of autonomous regulatory bodies have been the result.  
The new regulatory reform policy in Norway 
In 2003 Norway was assessed by the EU regulatory task force with a view to 
introducing reforms that would foster competition, innovation, economic growth and 
important social objectives (OECD 2003). The OECD acknowledged that the Nordic 
incremental, consensus-oriented model of governance, emphasizing egalitarian values, a 
high level of mutual trust, solidarity, high standards of social welfare, an active 
intervening state, broad participation from affected interests, and a large public sector, 
had been successful. The regulatory agencies in Norway seemed to have developed 
without experiencing any major crisis; they coped well with technical tasks and had 
demonstrated good regulatory practice and a capacity for adaptation. 
In spite of this success and the fact that Norway still performs very well today, the 
OECD report suggested that Norway should abandon this governance model and 
«prepare for the future now». It was more or less taken for granted that the integrated, 
reactive, ad hoc and piecemeal approach, which balances different values and goals, 
should be replaced by comprehensive, proactive, and systematic regulatory reforms. 
Without any profound analysis, it was suggested that the well-functioning Norwegian 
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model should be replaced by the new OECD orthodoxy. The new recipe was to 
separate the regulatory role of the state from its roles as owner, policy-maker, and 
commercial actor, to upgrade competition policy to make it the main goal, to deregulate 
and liberalize state monopolies, to reduce state ownership, commercialize public 
services, and improve the performance, efficiency, and effectiveness of public spending. 
Competitive neutrality was said to be essential, and it was recommended that the 
commitment to competition should be more wholehearted and that the government 
should retain less public control in the liberalization process. What was not discussed 
was that such a change might well be at odds with the Norwegian state’s traditional 
norms and values and cause increased conflicts in society, thus reducing efficiency and 
effectiveness (Christensen and Lægreid 2004). 
The recommendations were: to separate the regulatory function from the commercial 
one and to reduce the potential for ministerial intervention by making agencies more 
autonomous and professional; to replace consensus-based decision-making with 
evidence-based decision-making; to limit political intervention in specific decisions by 
establishing expert-based appeal bodies removed from the central political level; and to 
reduce the opportunities for appealing decisions to the minister and the ministry’s scope 
for instructing the agencies. Further recommendations were to clarify the institutional 
framework and functional responsibility by formulating clear and unambiguous goals for 
the independent supervisory agencies; to improve co-ordination among the regulators; 
and to strengthen the framework for accountability and improve monitoring of 
agencies’ performance.  
The drive for regulatory reforms of the OECD type came under the Conservative-
Center government of 2001–2005. In 2003 the government put forward a White Paper 
to parliament (St.meld nr. 17 (2002–2003)) proposing changes in regulatory agencies. 
The White Paper, which aimed to establish an overarching and comprehensive 
regulatory policy, was influenced both by the OECD’s regulatory program and the 
European Economic Area Agreement, which gives Norway access to the EU internal 
market. It thus upgraded competition policy to a main issue in regulatory policy.  
The White Paper stated that more use of markets and decentralized models of 
steering and control should be supplemented with and counterbalanced by stronger 
regulatory activities on behalf of collective interests. First, the government underlined 
that regulatory agencies should have unambiguous roles, thus breaking with the 
Norwegian tradition of integrating different roles and functions. The aim was to create 
more horizontal specialization in the form of non-overlapping roles, as in the principle 
of «single-purpose organizations» in New Zealand (Boston et al. 1996). A main objective 
was to provide more clarity in the horizontal design of regulatory agencies by giving 
each regulatory agency non-contradictory collective goals, with no two agencies working 
towards the same goals.  
Second, regulatory agencies were to increase their independence from the ministries, 
political and professional premises were to be more clearly defined, and the way they 
were to be balanced made more explicit. Political considerations were to be confined 
primarily to establishing general norms via laws and rules while leaving individual cases 
to be handled by competent professionals in the regulatory agencies. The regulatory 
agencies were to be endowed with legitimacy by removing the ambiguity inherent in 
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mixing political and professional considerations and by making the balance between 
them more explicit. It was also stressed that the independence of regulatory agencies 
could be ensured by de-coupling regulatory activities from sectoral considerations and 
pressure, and by strengthening the professional competence of the regulatory agencies. 
The specific proposals based on these goals affected the regulatory agencies in 
several ways. It was proposed that some new agencies should be established by splitting 
up or merging existing ones. The government also wanted to limit the opportunities for 
ministers to instruct the agencies in the handling of individual cases. In addition, 
changes in this restriction would now require the approval of the cabinet as a whole, 
rather than of just a single minister, making the threshold for political intervention 
higher.  
Third, it was proposed to change the complaints procedure by establishing 
independent bodies of appeal. Only in cases indicated by specific important 
considerations would the cabinet be allowed to overturn a decision of the supervisory 
agencies, thus ensuring that the independence of the agencies was not undermined. 
Fourth, it was proposed to move seven regulatory agencies out of Oslo. It was argued 
that relocation would reduce political control and remove the agencies from the 
influence of other actors. This proposal was inspired by the capture literature (Majone 
1996) – re-location being an attempt to reduce the capture of regulatory agencies by 
regulated interests as well as by politicians. 
What is striking about the proposals and the arguments used to support them was 
that political steering and democratic control were hardly mentioned, indicating a heavy 
bias towards the NPM-oriented «supermarket state» rather than the centralized, 
hierarchical state (Olsen 1988). The need to strengthen the framework for accountability 
was not addressed either. Establishing independent bodies over which political control 
would not be particularly strong may well raise legitimacy concerns connected with 
accountability, but such challenges were not discussed. The impression given is that 
political control and influence from political executives is inappropriate and should 
therefore be modified or undermined. Although the report acknowledges that 
differentiating between political and professional decision-making premises might be 
difficult, it goes on to address this question as if it were easy. The proposal to limit 
control of agencies by executive politicians is treated as a bureaucratic-judicial issue 
rather than as a question of political democracy. The new proposed structures are not 
analyzed in terms of the consequences for political control. Neither is attention paid to 
the complexity implied by these proposals, such as the increased need for coordination.  
Another important feature of the report is its strong emphasis on the need for 
professional autonomy in regulatory agencies. However, there is little discussion of why 
this consideration should carry more weight than political-democratic considerations. 
The experience of other countries, such as the US, which has shown that independent 
regulatory agencies do not just secure professional autonomy but can also result in 
capture of a different type as well as the politicization of professions (Mitnick 1980), is 
barely mentioned in the report.  
The White Paper was controversial in its making and there were conflicts between 
the Ministry of Labour and Government Administration and other ministries and the 
affected agencies before it was issued. The main focus of the conflict and public debate 
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was the relocation issue, which diverted attention from the question of political control 
and agency autonomy. The government report resulted in a tug of war between some 
major parties in parliament and was eventually modified concerning the question of 
political control (Hommen 2003). The passage of the proposal through parliament had 
certain striking features. First, the part of the proposal that had been most controversial 
during the public debate, namely the relocation of several regulatory agencies, gave rise 
to little debate or tension. While the minister argued for relocation to reduce the 
problem of regulatory capture, the parliamentarians regarded it primarily as a regional 
policy issue.  
Second, when the proposal was addressed in the parliament, it was obvious that the 
Labour Party and the Socialist Left Party had the key (supporting relocation) to the 
solution of the question of more independent regulatory agencies. The focus now 
moved from the relocation issue to the independence issue, and confrontation was 
replaced by bargaining. After some bickering the governmental parties struck a deal with 
the two opposition parties, modifying their proposal on this point. The part of the 
proposal stipulating that independent appeal boards should handle complaints or 
appeals was withdrawn and postponed until the next election period. This was seen as 
important by opponents of the proposal, since keeping the handling of appeals in the 
ministries is an important part of political control.  
The other part of the deal was more ambiguous. It was decided that the proposal to 
restrict the power of executive political leaders to instruct the agencies should be 
handled case by case, not as a general principle. This was nonetheless seen by the 
minister as a breakthrough for the new principle of reduced ministerial instruction, since 
he gained support for some specific proposals. The opposition, on the other hand, tried 
to give the impression that this would lead to very little change in overall political 
control and was of purely symbolic importance, since ministers seldom use their right to 
instruct. The agreement states that the minister can intervene in important cases and 
that he/she can instruct the regulatory agencies to handle specific cases, implying 
business as usual. For the Labour Party it was important not to reduce the opportunities 
for political control, while for the minister it was significant that agency independence 
had been underlined. The compromise was ambiguous and open to both interpretations 
Summing up, the government received support for the relocation of seven agencies, 
but the price it had to pay was a modification of the autonomy-oriented reform. 
However, this is not the last word on administrative reform. After the general election 
in 2005 Norway got a Centre-Left majority government with a more skeptical attitude 
towards the regulatory policy of the former government. There may well be a replay on 
the autonomy issue when the government proposes reforms of individual regulatory 
agencies or when it comes to actual daily practice in these agencies – a subject to which 
we now turn.  
Case-studies of regulatory agencies 
It is important to distinguish between general regulatory policy, specific reform 
processes connected to individual agencies, and how regulatory agencies operate on a 
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day-to-day basis. Both on the macro level (in the establishment of specific agencies) and 
on the micro level (their day-to-day practice) there may be loose coupling to general 
regulatory policy. We will now illustrate variations in the reform process and agency 
practice by focusing on two cases in each category. We will use these case studies to 
contrast the two main theoretical approaches, one based on the official model and 
rational-economic thinking, and the other on a combination of instrumental and 
institutional perspectives known as the transformative approach. 
We will first analyze how prominent the tension between political control and 
professional autonomy was in the processes leading up to the establishment of  new 
agencies of internal security and a new autonomous structure of the immigration 
administration. In the next section we look at how regulatory agencies work in practice 
and to what extent this reflects features of the simplistic official model or of the more 
complex alternative model. 
The  e s t ab l i s hmen t  and  o r gan i z a t i on  o f  r egu l a t o r y  
agenc i e s  
The reorganization of internal security1 
Parallel to the formulation of the comprehensive governmental program of regulatory 
policy, a reorganization of the central apparatus for internal security was taking place. 
The government launched this process in 1999 by appointing a public commission to 
assess the vulnerability of Norwegian society. The commission’s report was submitted 
to the Ministry of Justice in 2000 (NOU 2000:24). One of the commission’s main 
proposals was to improve vertical and horizontal co-ordination in the security 
administration by establishing a new special ministry of internal security. These 
recommendations were not, however, approved by the government in the White Paper 
presented to parliament in 2002 (St.meld. nr. 17 (2001–2002)). Somewhat surprisingly, 
the process resulted in only minor changes in the security administration (Lægreid and 
Serigstad 2006, Serigstad 2003). An important finding is that this relatively 
comprehensive reorganization process yielded only minor changes in the status quo, 
despite the fact that the Vulnerability Commission had recommended radical 
organizational changes.  
Ultimately a hierarchical model of this kind proved to be too radical for the 
ministries involved, and the government opposed the idea of a special ministry of 
internal security in favor of an upgrading and strengthening of the agencies in the field, 
achieved partly through mergers and partly by establishing more semi-autonomous 
agencies. However, no separate appeal boards or specific limitations on instructions 
from the ministries were introduced. The case illustrates how difficult it is to move 
responsibility for an agency from one ministry to another. The Ministry of Justice 
received approval for its traditional view of how to organize the field, and so did the 
Ministry of Defense. In contrast to the major dispute that took place over the 
organizational model, there was overall agreement about what the problems were in the 
field of internal security. Most of the bodies and actors involved acknowledged the 
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problems of fragmentation, weak co-ordination, and low priority assigned to internal 
security, but no agreement on a radical organizational solution was possible. 
The process revealed a conflict over how to define internal security. Should it be 
regarded primarily as a defense matter or should be treated as an aspect of civil society 
and therefore be assigned to the Ministry of Justice? Should it be regarded as just one of 
many spheres covered by general regulatory policy or rather as a special field with its 
own particular problems and challenges? Clearly the definition of internal security also 
had implications for identifying the main problems, finding appropriate solutions, and 
identifying legitimate actors and participants. Opinion here was divided between 
institutions rather than cutting across them. Disagreement between the justice and 
defense sectors over how to define safety, security, and preparation for emergencies, 
and where to place responsibility for them became most pronounced during the 
governmental process and in the parliamentary reading. The compromise was to 
abandon the radical solution of a new ministry and to go some way towards 
strengthening the coordinating responsibility of the Ministry of Justice by merging two 
agencies into a new Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning and by 
having the National Security Authority report to the Ministry of Justice in civilian cases 
while continuing to be administrative subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. 
An analysis of the process shows the relevance of a broad transformative approach. 
As the process went on, the rational approach gradually gave way to negotiations, which 
could be understood from an instrumental perspective. In contrast to what a rational 
approach might have predicted, the goals became ambiguous and subject to change and 
there was a loose coupling between the general regulatory program and the specific 
reorganization process, and between different phases of the process. The solutions 
offered by different actors and the conflict between different parties can be construed 
primarily in terms of organizational affiliation and sector interests. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the increasing pressure from the environment in the post 9/11 period had 
little effect on the reorganization process. 
In addition, local rationality and efforts to defend path-dependent institutional 
identity and ensure institutional survival as well as cultural collusion between the civilian 
and military administrations explain important aspects of the reorganization process. 
One important characteristic of the process was that the defense sector was opposed to 
co-ordination. While almost everyone agreed that horizontal co-ordination was of 
utmost importance and that improvements were necessary, none of the actors ultimately 
wanted to engage in co-ordination. The process can thus be said to be characterized by 
negative co-ordination (Mayntz and Sharpf 1975), where the wish to co-ordinate was greater 
than the willingness to engage in it.  
Summing up, this process is an interesting documentation of the parallel features of 
robustness and flexibility, which cannot easily be explained in terms of a single factor or 
as a simple adaptation of the comprehensive regulatory program. Our analysis reveals a 
process of bureaucratic politics (Allison 1971) but also a strong component of 
institutional constraints based on path-dependency, institutional identity, and historical 
inefficiency (Krasner 1988, Selznick 1957). The case illustrates that strong sectoral 
ministries make it difficult for the cabinet and the Ministry of Government 
Administration to implement a comprehensive regulatory policy program. There is no 
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quick and easy adaptation to new regulatory policy signals from the executive, and the 
process can thus best be understood from a broad transformative perspective – as a 
blend of actor-specific interests, made relevant in negotiations, institutional identities 
and traditions, and instrumental choices made by political-administrative leaders.  
Reorganizing the central immigration administration2 
In 1988 the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (NDI) was established. Its task was 
to integrate regulation and integration on the agency level and report to the Ministry of 
Justice on regulatory issues and to the Ministry of Local Government and Regional 
Development on integration issues. In 2001 this changed when the field of immigration 
policy was concentrated at the ministerial level in one ministry – the Ministry of Local 
Government. The Immigration Appeals Board (IAB) was established as a body with a 
lot of autonomy, while the NDI gained greater autonomy, potentially undermining the 
political control of the executive. The immigration administration thus became 
concentrated in one institution and was defined as belonging in one sector, but the 
formal levers of political control were weakened. 
What characterized the overall decision-making process that culminated in radical 
changes in the central immigration administration in 2001? The process was primarily 
driven by a Labour government, which had some problems controlling it, resulting in a 
postponement of the decision on the IAB. The Conservative Party and the Progress 
Party (far right) were consistently against such a reorganization, because they opposed 
an undermining of political control, while the view of the other parties fluctuated. The 
administrative leadership seemed to support the reorganization and worked together 
with the political leadership to promote it. This is interesting, given that such a 
reorganization could potentially weaken its position, but its main concern seemed to be 
capacity problems. 
Throughout the process the focus was on regulation, while integration was regarded 
as a secondary issue. The main argument for establishing an independent appeals board 
was overload and capacity problems in the Ministry of Justice, but blame-avoidance was 
also an issue. The prospect of an increased workload of immigration cases, not to 
mention the unpredictable nature of these cases, made it attractive to delegate such tasks 
to a board/agency. Added to this was the politically sensitivity of many immigration 
cases, which represented an unwanted political burden for the political executive. It was 
also argued that the current administrative trend was to move professional 
administrations handling individual cases out of the ministries. 
Another main argument for establishing the IAB and giving the NDI more 
independence was that the rule of law, impartiality, fairness and trust would all be 
enhanced. Many of the main actors assumed that when executive politicians got 
involved in individual immigration cases, they had a tendency to treat equal cases 
differently and often in a less restrictive way. So moving the handling of individual cases 
out to the agencies and preventing executive politicians from interfering was deemed to 
be better. The combination of independence, professional competence and objective 
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laws/rules was seen as a safeguard against arbitrary action. The media, interest groups 
and the professional administration all seemed to lack trust in politicians in this regard. 
In addition, executive politicians themselves encouraged this development in order to 
rid themselves of a political burden, while the opposition thought that it might lead to a 
less restrictive immigration policy.  
This process can generally be understood in terms of the official OECD model. All 
the major rational arguments in the model were taken account of and supported by a 
majority of the actors. At the same time the bid to «sell» the reform by simply taking for 
granted that this was the best model clearly had a symbolic flavor. Moreover, there was 
a conspicuous lack of discussion of the potential effects of undermining political control 
and breaking with administrative traditions. 
The Conservative-Centre minority government that came to power in 2001 was 
supposed to implement the new structure in the immigration administration. The irony 
was that the new minister of local government, a politically strong minister, came from 
the Conservative Party (she later became its leader), one of the two parties most 
consistently opposed to the new solution in the immigration administration. The 
Christian Democrats, however, who had played a leading role in the decision-making 
process, had invested quite a lot of prestige in the new solution as had the PM. 
In 2004, the Ministry of Local Government proposed a new structure for the central 
immigration administration. Its main argument, which concurred with the view taken by 
the Conservative Party in the 1990s, was that the structure adopted in 2001 implied an 
undermining of the responsibility of the political leadership. It was therefore deemed 
necessary to regain political control over the implementation of immigration law in 
practice. The ministry stressed that the structure, which prevented the political executive 
from interfering in individual cases, was unique and deviant both in Norway and in a 
comparative perspective. It also underscored that having such weak levers of control in 
a politically sensitive policy area was problematic, and that in order to be more proactive 
it was important to have instruments that could be used more quickly and effectively. At 
the same time, it recognized that bringing many individual cases back into the ministry 
would not be in tune with general developments in the civil service, so turning back the 
clock to before 2001 was out of the question. It was therefore proposed to seek a hybrid 
solution, something in between the structures of 1988 and 2001. 
The ministry proposed, first, that it should give the NDI general instructions 
concerning interpretation of the immigration law and its powers of discretion, i.e. 
potentially stronger frame-steering than the 2001 structure. Second, the information 
flow from the NDI to the ministry was to be closely regulated. The NDI was to be 
issued with guidelines for deciding what kind of practice and changes it should inform 
the ministry about. Third, the ministry would decide whether an application approved 
by the NDI should be handled by a new large board in the IAB, which should also 
address positive decisions in the NDI. Thus, the arguments concerning political control 
had changed quite a bit since 2001.  
The process leading up to the reorganization of the immigration administration in 
2004 was tightly politically controlled by a strong minister. She had majority backing in 
the Storting and did not pay much heed to criticism from the NDI, the IAB and the 
relevant societal groups. Thus in these muddy political waters the official OECD model 
WORKING PAPER  12  –  2006 MODERN REGULATORY  AGENCIES   
 20
underwent some modifications, even though its supporters insisted it was the best 
model. The main reasons for the reorganization were an increase in the pressure exerted 
by immigration cases, increased politicization and unpredictability in the field and the 
need for a quicker response, a strong anti-immigration opposition party, several 
politically sensitive individual cases, where the political leadership had been blamed, 
even though responsibility had been delegated to the NDI, and last, but not least, an 
increased need for political control in a minority government situation. The political 
symbols were this time turned against the OECD regulatory model and it was argued 
that the new hybrid solution was compatible with administrative traditions. 
How  r egu l a t o r y  agen c i e s  wo rk  i n  p r a c t i c e   
We will now look at whether regulation works smoothly in practice, in line with the 
objectivity, transparency, and efficiency gains assumed by the OECD model, or whether 
it is actually a more complex and tension-ridden process, as a broad transformative 
approach would suggest. 
The Norwegian Competition Authority3 
Following the passing of a new competition law in Norway in 1993, the Norwegian 
Competition Authority (NCA) was established the following year as the body 
responsible for enacting and operating competition policy; the Ministry of Government 
Administration continued to be the central controlling body, handling strategic aspects 
and complaints. In the latter part of the 1990s the NCA was gradually allocated more 
tasks, eventually taking charge of competition policy in both the public and the private 
sector. A crucial question was how the interface between competition regulation policy 
and more sector-specific economic regulation, pertaining to sectors like postal services 
and telecommunications, finance, transport, health, and agriculture, should be 
organized. In 1996, the NCA concluded agreements with two other overlapping 
regulatory agencies.  
In 2001, a professor of economics and member of the Conservative Party was 
appointed as the new minister. He acted proactively and changed the mandate of a 
public committee whose task was to discuss and propose a new competition law. He 
also sought to make the NCA stronger and more independent, to bring all competition 
policy together in one agency, and to establish an independent appeals body. While he 
failed to achieve most of these goals he did manage generally to strengthen the position 
of the NCA through the new competition law (Bertelsen 2006). 
We will briefly discuss how the NCA has managed its gradually increasing role, i.e. 
what features have been characteristic of its regulatory practice? How easy has it been to 
enact «pure» competition principles? How much has it been affected by the ministry, the 
subjects of regulation, the media, or other parts of the environment? And how has the 
negotiation aspect of regulation been conducted? Two cases will be used to address 
these questions. 
                                                 
3 This section is based on Folmo (2005). 
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In 2001, the Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) announced its intention to buy a 
70% stake in the other major airline in Norway – Braathens. The NCA immediately 
became involved because the deal threatened to establish a monopoly – thus violating 
the principle of competition. Two months later, the NCA indicated that it would 
probably reject the deal but would look into mileage programs, deals with major 
customers, and deals with travel agents in order to improve the competitive position of 
Braathens. It rejected the argument that Braathens was likely to go bankrupt, which had 
been used as a justification for the deal, and even took the proactive step of searching 
for other potential buyers for Braathens. However, the situation changed quickly, 
especially after 9/11, and it proved impossible to find a buyer for Braathens, rendering 
the company technically bankrupt. All this increased the likelihood of getting political 
backing for a merger. 
Upon assuming office in October 2001 the new minister of government 
administration immediately instructed the NCA to stop SAS going through with the 
deal. This move made it formally impossible for him to handle the case and he had to 
leave it to another minister. A short time later, however, to the surprise of many, the 
NCA approved the deal and did not touch the mileage program, something that was 
supported by the minister temporarily handling the case. That was not the end of the 
story, however. The ministries of finance and government administration pressured the 
NCA to look at the mileage program again, and the NCA eventually decided that the 
SAS would have to curtail its domestic mileage program in order to open up this field 
for new actors. Despite protests by the airlines, the minister supported this decision and 
in 2002 the Norwegian Air Shuttle was established with the minister’s support. What is 
more, he soon struck a big deal with the new company, guaranteeing it a large volume of 
governmental travelers, despite having said a short time before that such deals would 
obstruct competition. 
This case demonstrates how difficult it is for the NCA to fulfill its role as a 
competition authority objectively, since work is complicated by the need to respond to 
environmental pressure. In this particular case 9/11 completely changed the premises 
for making a decision, both in terms of external pressure and in terms of the legal 
framework. Ironically, while the NCA assumed that a rejection of the deal would have 
very little political support, it was the two ministries involved that actually put pressure 
on the NCA to pay greater heed to the competition law. The minister also participated 
in creating new biases in the market, favoring the interests of a new company over those 
of SAS, despite the fact that the Norwegian government holds a 2/7 share in SAS. As a 
result the position of SAS in Norway was considerably weakened. Clearly the process 
did not run smoothly or rationally at all, but was characterized by environmental 
pressure, anticipated reactions, and negotiations, while the NCA’s initial attempt to 
proceed according to the rules received little support from the political executive. 
The next case concerns two of the largest financial institutions in Norway – DnB and 
Gjensidige Nor. In 2003 they decided to merge, potentially giving them a 60–70% share 
of the market. The case was handled not only by the NCA and its ministry, but also by 
the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway and the Ministry of Finance. In August 
2003, the NCA warned the two companies that it might say no to the deal, prompting 
strong criticism from the media and many politicians, since it was seen as the last chance 
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to establish a large Norwegian financial company. The merger was then approved by the 
financial authority and the Norwegian National Bank, both of whom saw few problems 
with it, and the two merging banks then sought to persuade the NCA to sanction the 
deal. Eventually, the NCA agreed to the merger, but only if 13 preconditions were 
fulfilled, including sales of assets and subsidiaries. The minister of government 
administration, who had actually left office just prior to the decision, voiced his 
opposition to it, accusing the NCA of failing to play its role as a protector of 
competition. 
As in the first case, the NCA again experienced a lot of pressure from the environ-
ment, this time of a more nationalistic or cultural nature, revealing that many political 
actors were less concerned about competition policy than about creating a major 
Norwegian financial company. This time, however, the NCA had more control over the 
negotiation process. Anticipating that the Ministry of Finance would agree to the deal 
anyhow, the NCA obviously thought it would be wiser to give its conditional approval 
than to adhere rigidly to the provisions of the law on competition. By imposing certain 
conditions, it would appear to be upholding the principles of competition to a greater 
extent that in the first case. Another interesting aspect of the second case is the conflict 
with the other authorities that viewed the proposed merger more positively, thus making 
it easier for the Ministry of Finance to agree to the deal, as the NCA had anticipated 
would happen. 
Norwegian Post and Telecommunications Authority4  
The Norwegian Post and Telecommunications Authority (NPTA) was established in 
1987 as a result of the liberalization of the telecommunications sector. Its rationale was 
a perceived need to divide the regulatory and service-providing roles – which was very 
much in accordance with the later OECD model. The role of NPTA, which is primarily 
financed by government-imposed dues and fees, was to take responsibility for the 
regulatory, control, and scrutiny functions in the telecommunications and postal sectors. 
It was organized as a body subordinate to the Ministry of Transport and Communi-
cations but with some degree of independence: the power to take decisions on 
individual cases was delegated to the NPTA, and a clause in the law on telecommuni-
cations restricted the ministry’s power to issue instructions to the agency. The agency 
gradually developed a skeptical attitude towards Telenor, the former public tele-
communications monopoly, which was turned into a state-owned company and then 
partially privatized in 2001. The reason for this was that Telenor was seen as the main 
roadblock to increased and free competition in the telecommunications sector, and 
hence as undermining the interests of consumers.  
The background to the Teletopia case was that several small firms had for a long 
time been trying, largely unsuccessfully, to sell services by connecting to the Telenor 
network. In 2001, NPTA decided that Telenor should give Teletopia, a small private 
firm, access to its cell-phone network for providing SMS messages. Telenor appealed to 
the ministry to reverse the decision but it was upheld. The issue was now to decide on 
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the conditions of access. As Telenor and Teletopia were unable to reach agreement the 
NPTA acted as a mediator. After a lot of argument between the two parties, the NPTA 
ruled on the case in early 2003, deciding which price model should be used and 
stipulating that Telenor should not be compensated over and above the actual access 
costs. An exact access price to be paid by Teletopia to Telenor per SMS message was 
set, albeit one much lower than Telenor had demanded. 
Telenor criticized the NPTA’s decision, on the grounds of wrong assessment of the 
cost question. It lodged a formal and comprehensive appeal with the Council for 
Telecommunications Administration. The council upheld the decision, but Telenor also 
appealed to the ministry, a legitimate move in cases concerning wider principles. The 
ministry eventually ruled that another pricing model, closer to what Telenor wanted, 
should be used. The NPTA was very critical of this decision. 
An analysis of the case shows that a rational economic approach has less to offer 
than a broad transformative approach. One may take as a point of departure the 
complexity of both the political-administrative apparatus and the handling of the case. 
Even though the NPTA obviously has features that coincide with the OECD model, it 
works differently in practice. There are many reasons for this. To start with, the NPTA 
is an example of a cross-sectoral regulatory agency. It is thus a hybrid organization, a 
feature that may complicate the handling of certain cases. Second, the 
telecommunications sector is said to combine deregulation and re-regulation – the latter 
implying the existence of clear laws and rules for handling cases. In reality, however, the 
Teletopia case shows that the system is open to interpretation, particularly in 
complicated cases. Hence both the NPTA and the ministry engaged in negotiations. 
Third, path-dependency clearly has a major role to play in cases like this, since the 
monopoly actor (in this case Telenor) had invested a lot of resources in its network and 
services and had the advantage of having strong political connections. The NPTA, on 
the other hand, was interested in defending the newer anti-monopoly and competition 
path. The earlier stated principle of cost-oriented prices that constrained the handling of 
the case was also the product of path-dependency. Fourth, environmental pressure was 
strong, both from the institutional environment, constituted mainly by the media, and 
from the technical environment, involving many new actors in telecommunications; 
moreover, the EU influences both the institutional and technical environments. 
Contrary to the belief that the new regulatory regime is a clear-cut and objective 
system, the essence of the Teletopia case reveals an ambiguous system of negotiation 
and a struggle to balance control and autonomy. While the leadership of the NPTA took 
a rather skeptical attitude towards Telenor and strove to set a much lower access price 
than Telenor wanted, the experts in the agency exercised a modifying influence, showing 
that price models could be varied and disputed. These negotiations were then extended 
to the handling of the case in the appeals council, which sided with the NPTA. Not 
surprisingly, the final decision in the ministry fell in favor of Telenor, something that 
can be explained in terms of path-dependency, traditional political support for Telenor 
and worries that new actors would become free-riders on major investments made by 
traditionally strong public actors in the past, thus discouraging further major investment 
by the latter. All these factors modified the judicial and economic arguments and the 
exercising of discretion lower down the system, mainly in the NPTA. 
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Discussion 
A main observation from these cases is that one cannot easily infer from regulatory 
programs and formal structure to practice. There is rather loose coupling between 
comprehensive policy programs and specific reorganizations in certain policy areas, and 
agency status in itself is a highly uncertain predictor of steering relationships (Pollitt 
2003). The legal status and formal powers of the regulatory agencies represent broad 
categories that allow for huge variations in practice. Contrary to the OECD’s 
assumption, actual regulatory practice does not always concur with regulatory 
orthodoxy.  
The first two cases show that it is difficult to implement the new regulatory policy 
through inter-agency cooperation and mergers, and also that important actors are 
skeptical that changing the structure according to the new general regulatory policy will 
really result in smarter regulatory practice. In the homeland security case one reason for 
this was that organizing this field according to the new logic would have modified the 
agencies’ ability to attend to different aspects of internal security. Path-dependency 
obstruction of reorganizations is also an issue. In the immigration case there is an 
unstable balance between political control and agency autonomy, and it is difficult to 
find a sustainable organizational form. While negotiations took place and major political 
actors controlled parts of the reorganization process, opinions about organizational 
instruments or forms changed. This illustrates one of Gulick’s (1937) main points that 
organizing public organizations according to certain principles of specialization and 
coordination may solve some problems, but it may also create some new ones. The 
formal organizational structure is important for understanding variety in decision-
making behavior, but no one specific design can guarantee smart practice (Hammond, 
Jen and Maeda 2003, Hammond 2004). In practice it is difficult to live up to the 
organizational model espoused by the new regulatory policy. 
The two latter cases on practice illustrate the problems of matching administrative 
practice with the new regulatory orthodoxy. These cases concern more the vertical 
dimension of regulatory policy. The cases dealt with by the competition authority 
illustrate the complicated interaction between political signals and professional decision-
making in the competition agency. In some cases political and managerial executives in 
an agency can form a powerful alliance; in other cases there might be a complex 
interplay between environmental pressure, professional attitudes, and political 
considerations. The system of regulation in the post and telecommunications sector in 
Norway now corresponds closely with the official, ideal model of the OECD. The case 
shows how the different actors have furthered their own roles and interests according to 
this model, but it is not a model that automatically results in objective and smart 
practice. When different actors disagree because they play different roles, conceptually 
driven cooperation is difficult to achieve, and the ministry has the task of balancing the 
different definitions and interpretations. The result in a political-administrative context 
is a compromise that is the smartest one possible under the circumstances. 
Historically, Norway has had a rather unified and integrated central state system, with 
relatively strong political control of agencies by the cabinet and the ministries 
(Christensen 2003). Nevertheless, this system has been flexible enough to accommodate 
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a variety of considerations. In practice the system has been very robust, since the agency 
model represents a broad organizational form that allows a wide variety of actions. 
Using as a basis our broad institutional perspective, it is possible to show how the 
system has combined hierarchical control by politicians, the influence and partial 
autonomy of professional groups, a stable environment, a cultural consensus, and the 
peaceful coexistence of many actors, creating an atmosphere of mutual trust.  
When NPM arrived in Norway in the 1980s, the main strategy was to adapt it to the 
historical path Norway had followed, i.e. to engage in a policy of pragmatic change 
whereby some elements from NPM—usually the least radical ones—were introduced 
(Christensen and Lægreid 1998). However, this strategy came under pressure in the 
1990s, resulting in more autonomy for the agencies. The reasons for this development 
may be understood in terms of the main elements in the broad transformative 
perspective. First, neo-liberal entrepreneurs became more important in the reform 
process, partly because the electoral wind was blowing more towards the right, but also 
because the Labour Party had shifted to the right on these questions. Second, the 
historical-cultural path was gradually being modified, partly as a result of external 
pressure for reform, but mainly because internal actors, both political and 
administrative, had adopted a more sympathetic attitude towards NPM. Third, the 
notion that major elements from the disintegrated state model were appropriate 
increasingly became the received wisdom. The paradox is that this happened without 
Norway having any urgent need to reform, but it also explains why the old model was 
not abandoned but rather combined with NPM in various ways, without actually 
bringing about any fundamental transformation of the system. 
The effects of this first wave of NPM-related reforms seem to be rather evident. One 
main finding from a study of political and administrative elites in Norway is that the 
increase in autonomy for agencies has limited cabinet members’ leeway for political 
discretion and control (Christensen and Lægreid 2002). The vertical specialization of 
agencies and companies has increased the power of administrative leaders in the 
ministries and agencies at the expense of the ministers. In contrast to what is sought by 
public choice reforms, this amounts to reduced control for the ministers and may 
increase the political risks that politicians have to take (c.f. Gregory 2003). The situation 
is still in a state of flux, however, and should not be seen as a one-way development. 
The telecommunication case and the competition case illustrate the complexity of the 
relationship between political executives and agency executives. In specific cases the 
political leadership is still able to interfere and to reassert control, as case studies of 
hospital reforms and immigration policy illustrate (Christensen and Lægreid 2005, 
Lægreid, Opedal and Stigen 2005). Generally in Norway the constraints on the option of 
withdrawing delegation to autonomous agencies have not been so strong as to represent 
a serious democratic problem (Hylland 2001). 
The process of horizontal specialization, based on practice in the Anglo-American 
countries in general and the EU in particular, started rather later in Norway, in the mid-
1990s, and has entailed separating out regulatory tasks and assigning them to specific 
agencies. However, this policy has yet to be fully implemented and may well run into 
problems, as illustrated by the case of internal security. It does, however, signal the 
adoption of another element in the general trend towards the disintegrated state. 
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Our broad transformative approach can be used to identify certain typical features of 
this reform process. First, it shows a political leadership eager to introduce more 
structural devolution. The arguments supporting this policy attend very little to the 
challenges of political control posed by a new system of this type and tend instead to see 
it mainly in terms of efficiency and technical aspects of administration. Thus, this policy 
in practice results in compromises concerning the autonomy of regulatory agencies and 
the organization of the appeals process, although it does move the regulatory agencies in 
the direction of more independence. The reform process is also generally characterized 
by rather inconsistent and ambiguous organizational thinking concerning the 
implications of autonomy and the way regulatory functions should be organized. 
Second, there is evidence of a changing culture concerning regulatory agencies. The 
executives of these agencies now tend to view the reforms more positively, as do 
administrative leaders in the ministries, making them easier to implement. Nevertheless, 
some political executives and parties in parliament remain skeptical, especially when 
recurring political crises, like the immigration case, show a need for more control 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2002).  
Third, external international pressure for reforms in Norway has grown over the last 
few years, as the notion that NPM-related reforms are appropriate and good becomes 
more widely accepted. Nevertheless, more criticism is now being voiced nationally than 
before, while international trends are starting to point in rather different directions, 
feeding this resistance. 
The four cases selected show that the regulatory policy field is politically very 
controversial and complex. Individual cases of reorganization or regulation cannot be 
viewed in isolation simply as examples of the technicalities of implementation but need 
to be treated as political cases, involving political steering and negotiations, external 
pressure, and historical-institutional constraints. The cases reveal that in practice it is 
hard to implement the new regulatory policy program and simultaneously live up to the 
official formal governance model of frame-steering and performance-management 
(Pollitt 2004). Neither does the practitioner’s model fit in very well with how the 
government’s comprehensive regulatory reform program is being implemented in 
specific policy areas. Rather than assuming that political executives can freely select 
desirable reform measures, one needs to take into consideration historical-institutional 
constraints and external pressure. And the objectivity of professional-judicial processes 
and considerations is often disputed and negotiable. The cases we described above 
illustrate that we have to go beyond the legal status and formal powers of the 
government and the agencies to understand how political control works in practice 
(Pollitt 2003). Smart regulatory practice is more diverse and context-dependent than the 
official model implies.  
This paper has focused on the mismatch between the doctrine of autonomous 
regulatory agencies and how regulatory agencies have been reorganized in specific policy 
areas and how they work in practice. The de facto control and autonomy relationship 
varies between agencies and within the same agency over time. The reform process has 
been dominated by the criteria used to determine how agencies are supposed to behave, 
according to an idealized model, rather than by empirical documentation of how they 
actually work in practice (Pollitt 2003). Furthermore, the dominant model is a 
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complicated mixture of the New Public Management ideal of performance 
management, frame-steering and agency autonomy on the one hand, and demands for 
democratic governance based on democratic transparency, accountability, control, and 
responsiveness on the other. We are facing simultaneous pressure to adapt to new 
forms of regulation and control and to guarantee the robustness of sustained democratic 
governance. These complex and sometimes conflicting demands place a heavy burden 
on both agency management and on political governance. Formal regulatory agency 
status seems to be a broad category allowing a variety of actual behavior. Thus, we must 
go beyond formal legal models of agency status and examine «living» institutions.  
An examination of the formulation of regulatory policy, the implementation of the 
policy program and how relations between ministries and agencies work in practice 
reveals a complex interaction between external pressure from dominant international 
agency doctrines, the domestic administrative and institutional context, and political 
choices made by government executives and political leaders (Christensen and Lægreid 
2001). To understand both policy development and practice in the field of regulatory 
agencies we have to go beyond one-factor explanations and look at transformation and 
translation processes (Czarniawska and Sevon 1996). The trade-off between autonomy 
and control will thus be influenced by the motivation of central actors to interfere. But 
the equation can also be affected by the distribution of professional expertise. If the 
ministry lacks the knowledge or capacity to assess what is going on in the agencies, it 
will also experience problems in exercising political control. This is especially likely to be 
the case with agencies handling complicated technical matters involving advanced 
science and technology. 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have focused on the balance between political control and regulatory 
agency autonomy in the central governmental apparatus in Norway. It has been shown 
how the introduction of a new regulatory policy has produced instability in the 
relationship rather than the enhanced stability promised by the reform entrepreneurs. 
Regulatory reform started late in Norway, so the focus of our analysis has been on 
processes that have taken place in the last few years, both concerning organizational 
thinking advanced by the political leadership and the compromises reached in 
parliament with its opponents. The result has been increased autonomy for the 
regulatory agencies and a more specific allocation of tasks, but not as much as intended. 
We then discussed how the general regulatory reform has been adapted to the 
reorganization of regulatory agencies in specific policy areas and to the way regulatory 
agencies operate in practice. The main picture is that there is a loose coupling between 
the OECD regulatory policy ideal and a) general Norwegian regulatory policy; b) the 
reorganization of regulatory agencies in specific policy areas; and c) regulatory practice 
in individual cases. 
In a period when the doctrine of agencification, structural devolution, and antonomi-
zation has been strong, there is considerable institutional confusion about what tasks, 
objectives, and responsibility the autonomous agencies should have (Olsen 1998). 
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Democratic control seems to have been weakened by this new autonomy, even if it is 
not absolute, but it is unclear what kinds of interests and considerations are replacing 
traditional political signals and discretion or how the trade-off between political control 
and agency autonomy will unfold over time.  
In recent years the importance of the historical-institutional context has been 
rediscovered (Olsen 2004). The need for in-depth understanding of the special 
situations of individual countries is now being underlined to a greater extent (World 
Bank 2000). Priorities have shifted from a drive to create agencies and autonomous 
bodies to a striving to achieve good governance generally. More specifically, attempts 
are being made to find the right balance between accountability and autonomy by 
focusing on weak co-ordination devices, lack of governing capacity and weak 
accountability mechanisms (OECD 2002b). One main lesson is that context matters. 
The effects of structural arrangements, culture, and the present parliamentary situation 
are dependent on the character of the policy issue on the agenda and the tasks that 
different agencies handle. The policy salience or sensitivity, often highlighted in political 
crises, seems to be an especially challenging factor in the balance between political 
control and autonomy. Strong sectoral ministries and weak superior ministerial 
coordinating power make it difficult to pursue a streamlined regulatory policy across 
policy areas and agencies. 
The data presented reveal that in practice it may become difficult to live up to the 
official formal regulatory model of frame-steering and professional autonomy. Our 
conclusion is that stability in the trade-off between autonomy and control is an elusive 
goal. Achieving a balance between the two has been a recurring problem in Norwegian 
administrative history (Grønlie 2001) and it is an open question whether more 
professional independence for experts in autonomous agencies will prevail, or whether 
there will be a counter-wave of re-politicization. The issue cannot be resolved once and 
for all. Instead, one has to learn to live with partly conflicting values. How this situation 
is handled is determined to a great extent by the domestic political-administrative 
culture and structural features as well as by the external influence of the dominant 
international administrative doctrine.  
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8‐2004  Renate  Storetvedt  Lien  og  Arnhild  Taksdal  «Integrering  av  kjønnsperspektiv  i  offentlig 
tjenesteproduksjon og planlegging». Mai 2004. 
9‐2004  Ingrid Helgøy  og Synnøve Serigstad: «Tilsyn  som  styringsform  i  forholdet mellom  staten og 
kommunene». Mai 2004. 
10‐2004  Morten Dyrdal: «Legemiddeltilsyn og europeisering». September 2004. 
11‐2004  Bodil  Ravneberg:  «Økonomiske  insentiv  i  arbeidslinjen,  virker  det?  Evaluering  av 
forsøksordning med kvalifiseringsstønad i ’Prosjektet Amalie’ i Åsane». Oktober 2004. 
12‐2004  Per  Lægreid  and  Synnøve  Serigstad:  «Organizing  for  Homeland  Security:  The  Case  of 
Norway». November 2004. 
13‐2004  Ivar Bleiklie: «Institutional Conditions and  the Responsibilities of Universities». November 
2004. 
14‐2004  Lise Hellebø: «Food Safety at Stake – the Establishment of Food Agencies». November 2004. 
15‐2004  Katarina  Østergren:  «The  Institutional  Construction  of  Consumerism.  A  Study  of 
Implementing Quality Indicators». November 2004.  
16‐2004  Ingrid Helgøy and Anne Homme: «Governance  in Primary and Lower Secondary Education. 
Comparing Norway, Sweden and England». November 2004. 
17‐2004  Tom Christensen, Per Lægreid and  Inger Marie Stigen: «Performance Management and Public 
Sector Reform: The Norwegian Hospial Reform». December 2004. 
18‐2004  Tom  Christensen  and  Per  Lægreid:  «Regulatory  Agencies  −  The  Challenges  of  Balancing 
Agency Autonomy and Political Control». December 2004. 
19‐2004  Dag  Arne  Christensen:  «Velferdsstat,  rettighetslovgivning  og  lokalt  selvstyre».  Desember 
2004. 
20‐2004  Kristin  Rubecksen:  «Civil  Service  Organizations  in  Norway:  Organizational  Features  and 
Tasks». December 2004. 
21‐2004  Kjell  Erik  Lommerud,  Odd  Rune  Straume  and  Lars  Sørgard:  «National  Versus  International 
Mergers in Unionised Oligopoly». December 2004. The Globalization Program. 
22‐2004  Birte Folgerø  Johannessen: «Ledelse og evidens  i det psykiske helsevernet, konsekvenser  for 
kunnskapsforståelse og organisering». Desember 2004. 
23‐2004  Jacob Aars og Svein Kvalvåg: «Politiske uttrykksformer i en bykontekst». Desember 2004. 
24‐2004  Ingrid Helgøy: «Active Ageing in the Labour Market. Country Report − Norway». December 
2004. 
25‐2004  Torgeir Sveri: «Strukturer og reformer. En kvalitativ analyse av reformen  ’Enhetlig  ledelse’ 
sett i lys av sykehusets arbeidsorganisering». Desember 2004. 
26‐2004  Stig Helleren: «Arbeidstilsynets rollekonflikt: Vekslende tilsynsstrategier mellom kontroll og 
veiledning». Desember 2004. 
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27‐2004  Kjell  Erik  Lommerud,  Frode  Meland  and  Odd  Rune  Straume:  «Globalisation  and  Union 
Opposition to Technological Change». December 2004. The Globalization Program. 
28‐2004  Frode  Meland:  «A  Union  Bashing  Model  of  Inflation  Targeting».  December  2004.  The 
Globalization Program. 
2003 
1‐2003  Tom Christensen og Per Lægreid: «Politisk styring og privatisering: holdninger i elitene og 
befolkningen». Mars 2003. 
2‐2003  Ivar Bleiklie, Per Lægreid and Marjoleine H. Wik: «Changing Government Control in Norway: 
High Civil Service, Universities and Prisons». March 2003. 
3‐2003  Badi H. Baltagi, Espen Bratberg and Tor Helge Holmås: «A Panel Data Study of Physiciansʹ 
Labor Supply: The Case of Norway». March 2003. HEB. 
4‐2003  Kjell  Erik  Lommerud,  Frode  Meland  and  Lars  Sørgard:  «Unionised  Oligopoly,  Trade 
Liberalisation and Location Choice». March 2003. The Globalization Program. 
5‐2003  Lise Hellebø: «Nordic Alcohol Policy and Globalization as a Changing Force». April 2003. 
6‐2003  Kim Ove Hommen: «Tilsynsroller i samferdselssektoren». April 2003. 
7‐2003  Tom  Christensen  and  Per  Lægreid:  «Trust  in  Government  –  the  Significance  of  Attitudes 
Towards Democracy, the Public Sector and Public Sector Reforms». April 2003. 
8‐2003  Rune Ervik: «Global Normative Standards and National Solutions for Pension Provision: The 
World Bank, ILO, Norway and South Africa  in Comparative Perspective». April 2003. The 
Globalization Program. 
9‐2003  Nanna Kildal: «The Welfare State: Three Normative Tensions». Mai 2003. 
10‐2003  Simon Neby: «Politisk styring og institusjonell autonomi – tre illustrasjoner». Mai 2003. 
11‐2003  Nina  Berven:  «Cross  National  Comparison  and  National  Contexts:  Is  what  we  Compare 
Comparable?». July 2003. The Globalization Program. 
12‐2003  Hilde  Hatleskog  Zeiner:  «Kontrollhensyn  og  kontrollpraksis.  En  studie  av  Food  and 
Veterinary Office (FVO)». August 2003. 
13‐2003 Nanna Kildal: «Perspectives on Policy Transfer: The Case of the OECD». August 2003. 
14‐2003 Erik Allardt: «Two Lectures: Stein Rokkan and the Twentieth Century Social Science». «Den 
sociala rapporteringens tidstypiska förankring». September 2003. 
15‐2003  Ilcheong  Yi:  «The  National  Patterns  of  Unemployment  Policies  in  Two  Asian  Countries: 
Malaysia and South Korea». September 2003. The Globalization Program. 
16‐2003 Dag Arne Christensen: «Active Ageing: Country Report Norway». November 2003. 
17‐2003 Kim Ove Hommen: «Tilsynspolitikk i Norge: Utflytting og autonomi». November 2003. 
18‐2003  Dag Arne Christensen, Rune Ervik and Ingrid Helgøy: «The Impact of Institutional Legacies on 
Active Ageing Policies: Norway and UK as Contrasting Cases». December 2003. 
19‐2003  Ole  Frithjof Norheim  og  Benedicte  Carlsen:  «Legens  doble  rolle  som  advokat  og  portvakt  i 
Fastlegeordningen. Evaluering av fastlegeordningen». Desember 2003. HEB. 
20‐2003  Kurt R. Brekke og Odd Rune Straume: «Pris‐ og avanseregulering  i  legemiddelmarkedet. En 
prinsipiell diskusjon og en vurdering av den norske modellen». Desember 2003. HEB. 
21‐2003  Per Lægreid, Vidar W. Rolland, Paul G. Roness and John‐Erik Ågotnes: «The Structural Anatomy 
of the Norwegian State 1947‒2003». December 2003. 
22‐2003  Ivar  Bleiklie, Haldor  Byrkjeflot  and  Katarina Östergren:  «Taking  Power  from Knowledge. A 
Theoretical Framework for the Study of Two Public Sector Reforms». December 2003. ATM.  
23‐2003  Per  Lægreid,  Ståle  Opedal  and  Inger  Marie  Stigen:  «The  Norwegian  Hospital  Reform  – 
Balancing Political Control and Enterprise Autonomy». December 2003. ATM. 
24‐2003  Håkon  Høst:  «Kompetansemåling  eller  voksenutdanning  i  pleie‐  og  omsorgsfagene? 
Underveisrapport fra en studie av pleie‐ og omsorgsutdanningene». Desember 2003. 
25‐2003  Kjell  Erik  Lommerud,  Odd  Rune  Straume  and  Lars  Sørgard:  «Downstream  merger  with 
upstream market power». The Globalization Program. December 2003. 
26‐2003  Ingrid Drexel: «Two Lectures: The Concept of Competence – an Instrument of Social and 
Political Change». «Centrally Coordinated Decentralization – No Problem? Lessons from the 
Italian Case». December 2003. 
2002 
1‐2002  Håkon  Høst:  «Lærlingeordning  eller  skolebasert  utdanning  i  pleie‐  og  omsorgsfagene?». 
April 2002. 
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2‐2002  Jan‐Kåre  Breivik,  Hilde  Haualand  and  Per  Solvang:  «Rome  –  a  Temporary  Deaf  City! 
Deaflympics 2001». June 2002. 
3‐2002  Jan‐Kåre Breivik, Hilde Haualand og Per Solvang: «Roma – en midlertidig døv by! Deaflympics 
2001». Juni 2002. 
4‐2002  Christian Madsen: «Spiller det noen rolle? – om hverdagen på nye og gamle sykehjem». Juni 
2002. 
5‐2002  Elin Aasmundrud Mathiesen: «Fritt  sykehusvalg. En  teoretisk  analyse  av konkurranse  i det 
norske sykehusmarkedet». Juni 2002. HEB. 
6‐2002  Tor Helge Holmås: «Keeping Nurses at Work: A Duration Analysis». June 2002. HEB. 
7‐2002  Ingvild Halland Ørnsrud:  «Mål‐  og  resultatstyring  gjennom  statlige  budsjettreformer».  Juli 
2002. 
8‐2002  Torstein Haaland: «Tid, situasjonisme og institusjonell utakt i systemer». Juli 2002. 
9‐2002  Kristin  Strømsnes:  «Samspillet  mellom  frivillig  organisering  og  demokrati:  Teoretiske 
argument og empirisk dokumentasjon». August 2002. 
10‐2002  Marjoleine Hooijkaas Wik:  «Mangfold  eller konformitet? Likheter og  forskjeller  innenfor og 
mellom fem statlige tilknytningsformer». August 2002. 
11‐2002  Knut Helland:«Den opprinnelige symbiosen mellom fotball og presse». September 2002. 
12‐2002  Nina Berven: «National Politics and Global Ideas? Welfare, Work and Legitimacy in Norway 
and the United States». September 2002. The Globalization Program. 
13‐2002  Johannes  Hjellbrekke:  «Globalisering  som  utfordring  til  samfunnsvitskapane».  September 
2002. Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
14‐2002  Atle  Møen:  «Den  globale  produksjonen  av  symbol  og  kunnskap.  Verdsflukt  og 
verdsherredømme». September 2002. Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
15‐2002  Tom Christensen  and  Per  Lægreid:  «Complex  Patterns  of  Interaction  and  Influence Among 
Political and Administrative Leaders». October 2002. 
16‐2002  Ivar Bleiklie: «Hierarchy and Specialization. On Institutional Integration of Higher Education 
Systems». Oktober 2002. 
17‐002  Per Lægreid, Runolfur Smari Steinthorsson and Baldur Thorhallsson: «Europeanization of Public 
Administration:  Effects  of  the  EU  on  the  Central  Administration  in  the  Nordic  States». 
November 2002. 
18‐2002  Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid: «Trust in Government — the Relative Importance of Service 
Satisfaction, Political Factors and Demography». November 2002. 
19‐2002  Marit  Tjomsland:  «Arbeidsinnvandringssituasjonen  i  Norge  etter  1975».  November  2002. 
Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
20‐2002  Augustín José Menéndez m.fl.: «Taxing Europe. The Case for European Taxes in Federal 
Perspective». December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
21‐2002  Fredrik Andersson and Kai A. Konrad: «Globalization and Risky Human Capital 
Investment».December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
22‐2002  Fredrik Andersson and Kai A. Konrad: «Human Capital Investment and Globalization in 
Extortionary States». December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
23‐2002  Anne Lise Fimreite, Yngve Flo og Jacob Aars: «Generalistkommune og oppgavedifferensiering. 
Tre innlegg». Desember 2002.  
24‐2002  Knut Grove: «Frå privat initiativ til kommunalt monopol. Lysverk, sporvegar og renovasjon i 
Bergen og Oslo 1850–1935». Desember 2002. 
25‐2002  Knut Grove: «Mellom ʹnon‐interventionʹ og ʹsamfundsvillieʹ. Statleg og kommunal regulering 
av økonomisk verksemd i Norge på 1800‐talet». Desember 2002. 
26‐2002  Dag Arne Christensen: «Hovedtyper av valgordninger. Proporsjonalitet eller politisk 
styring?». Desember 2002. 
27‐2002  Jan Erik Askildsen, Badi H. Baltagi and Tor Helge Holmås: «Will Increased Wages Reduce 
Shortage of Nurses? A Panel Data Analysis f Nursesʹ Labour Supply». December 2002. HEB. 
28‐2002  Sturla Gjesdal, Peder R. Ringdal, Kjell Haug and John Gunnar Mæland: «Medical Predictors of 
Disability Pension in Long‐Term Sickness Absence. December 2002. HEB. 
29‐2002  Dag Arne Christensen og Jacob Aars: «Teknologi og demokrati. Med norske kommuner på 
nett!». Desember 2002. 
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30‐2002  Jacob Aars: «Byfolk og politikk. Gjennomgang av data fra en befolkningsundersøkelse i 
Bergen, Oslo og Tromsø». Desember 2002. 
31‐2002  Hjørdis Grove: «Kommunaliseringsprosessen i Århus 1850–1940». Desember 2002. 
 
 
